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Abstract
An agent’s assessment of its trust in another agent
is commonly taken to be a measure of the reliabil-
ity/predictability of the latter’s actions. It is based
on the trustor’s past observations of the behaviour
of the trustee and requires no knowledge of the
inner-workings of the trustee. However, in situa-
tions that are new or unfamiliar, past observations
are of little help in assessing trust. In such cases,
knowledge about the trustee can help. A particu-
lar type of knowledge is that of values - things that
are important to the trustor and the trustee. In this
paper, based on the premise that the more values
two agents share, the more they should trust one
another, we propose a simple approach to trust as-
sessment between agents based on values, taking
into account if agents trust cautiously or boldly, and
if they depend on others in carrying out a task.
1 Introduction
Though vastly outnumbered and facing certain defeat in Ther-
mopylae, Leonidas still trusted that his soldiers would stand
and fight for Sparta with their lives. What made him have
such faith in them? It is plausible that his prior experience of
sharing the battlefield made him trust them. However, a more
compelling reason and one that is of interest to us, could be
because they shared common values: they valued their way
of life, they valued courage, they valued their freedom and
they valued Sparta.
Autonomous systems such as self-driving cars are becom-
ing a common sight and they have become a source of trep-
idation in humans. It appears inevitable that we must coex-
ist with them and such fears may be alleviated by design-
ing systems that humans can trust. In computation, there are
different perspectives from which to approach trust. An in-
teresting perspective that has largely motivated this work is
offered in [Roff and Danks, 2018] where two dimensions of
trust are presented: one that depends on reliability and/or
predictability and another that depends on one’s understand-
ing of other people’s values, preferences, expectations, con-
straints, and beliefs, where that understanding is associated
with predictability but is importantly different from it. It is
this latter dimension which relies on the knowledge of others.
Many definitions of trust can be found in the literature. We
adopt the following definition from [Lee and See, 2004]: the
attitude that an agent will help achieve an individual’s goals
in a situation characterized by uncertainty and vulnerability.
It is important to note that trust arises in situations where i)
a trustor expects the trustee to perform some action, and that
ii) trustors, in general, have no certainty about the motives
and actions of the trustees. For a survey of trust models, see
[Sabater and Sierra, 2005].
Out of the ‘reliability and/or predictability’ dimension and
the ‘knowledge dimension’, the focus in AI has largely been
on the former. For instance, one of the earliest works in
computational trust [Marsh, 1994] was based on this dimen-
sion. The trustor in such cases relies on past observa-
tions of the trustee’s behaviour and has no deep knowledge
of the trustee. For example, I trust my car will start in
the morning without knowing the inner-workings of the car
[Roff and Danks, 2018]. The problem with this dimension is
that since it relies on past experiences, if situations arise that
are either new or unfamiliar, it is not clear how much to trust
or even worse how to trust. This is especially important for
autonomous agents as theymay find themselves in worlds that
are chaotic and ever-changing. They are certain to encounter
situations that they have not seen before and choosing how
much to trust another agent based on past experiences is fu-
tile. This is where trust based on the second dimension can
help. The agent’s trust in another agent is a function of its
knowledge of the latter. Such knowledge could consist of
many things but an important factor in the context of trust is
knowing what things are important to others, i.e. their values.
For instance, if both you and your architect value beauty, you
can trust your architect to deliver a design that is beautiful.
This paper is premised upon why Leonidas trusted his sol-
diers and why you could trust your architect – the sharing
of common values. It is reasonable to assume that the more
you share values with someone, the more likely you will trust
them. We focus on agents that have to rely on other agents
to execute certain actions for them but in order to do so they
must find the most trustworthy ones. That is, they will seek
agents that share their values. We begin by presenting a trust
assessment model that relies on both the dimensions – relia-
bility and value sharing. We then constrain our model to one
where only values are used, as that is the focus of this paper.
We briefly discuss what values are and how they may be used
in trust assessment. Several different ways that trust may be
assessed are presented. We end by discussing the limitations
of this work and how it may be further extended.
2 A Trust Assessment Model
The scenario that we consider in this paper is an environ-
ment consisting of autonomous agents that can execute ac-
tions. Our work is motivated by the Belief-Desire-Intention
(BDI) agent model [Rao, 1995] but we limit our discussion
only to the features of BDI agents that are relevant to our
work. Let A = {A,B, . . .} represent the set of all agents.
There is also a set A = {a′, a′′ . . .} which represents the set
of all possible actions. Note that agents may not be able to
execute every action inA but they may still be aware of those
actions and of other agents that can execute them. The goal
of an agent may either be to change the state of the world or
get some information about its current state.
Definition 1 Let A be an agent with some goal and B be
another agent that can help achieve A’s goal by executing
action a′. We define A’s trust assessment of B w.r.t a′ as:
TA(B, a
′) = α TRelA (B, a
′) + β TKA (B, a
′),
where α and β are weights, TRelA (B, a
′) represents A’s trust
assessment of B based on reliability and predictability, and
TKA (B, a
′) represents A’s trust assessment of B based on its
knowledge of B.
If we take the measure of trust to be the probability with
which A thinks B can help achieve its goal by executing a′,
then TA(B, a
′) ∈ [0, 1]. Since TRelA (B, a
′) relies on past
observations, it is implicit that A has a history of executed
actions to draw on that involve B and this makes it amenable
to machine learning techniques. However, it could turn out
that no such history is available; in that case, TRelA (B, a
′) can
be taken to be 0 and therefore, TA(B, a
′) = β TKA (B, a
′).
This will be the extent of our discussion of TRelA (B, a
′). We
now turn to TKA (B, a
′) which is the main focus of the paper.
The weight β is not important and we ignore it in our dis-
cussion. In the rest of this paper, we will focus on only one
kind of knowledge of the trustee, namely, its values. We refer
to TKA (B, a
′) as A’s value-based trust assessment of B w.r.t.
action a′ or simply trust assessment when it is clear from the
context.
2.1 Values
Values are things that are important to us. According to
Schwartz’s Theory of Basic Values [Schwartz, 2012], all val-
ues exhibit six features that include: i) being able to be ac-
tivated and causing emotions to rise, ii) acting as goals that
can motivate action, iii) guiding the selection of actions and,
iv) being able to be ordered by importance. Additionally,
in [Schwartz, 2012], ten broad values such as benevolence,
power, security and conformity are identified under which
more concrete values may fall.
Values may also be compatible with each other (conformity
and security) or be in conflict with each other (benevolence
and power).1 Although one could argue that trust (trustwor-
thiness) is itself a value, the central premise of this paper is
that trust between two agents arises based on the compatibil-
ity of their values. This view of trust is in line with value sen-
sitive design [Friedman et al., 2013] which takes into account
human values during the design process of systems which in
our case is a trust assessment system.
We assume all agents have values that are explicitly pro-
grammed. The ten broad values mentioned earlier are useful
but too coarse for our purpose. Those values are likely to be
universal [Schwartz, 2012], meaning, they are likely present
in all agents and differentiating agents based on those values
is almost impossible. The values that we consider are there-
fore taken to be more concrete values which may be classified
under these broader values. Agents may share values but they
may also have personal values unique to them. Agents may
have conflicting values but as in [Schwartz, 2012] we take
that conflicting values are not pursued in a single action. This
has an important implication that specific to each action is a
set of non-conflicting values that the agent considers impor-
tant.
Values are assumed to be activated when the state of the
world changes due to an agent’s own actions or actions of
other agents. As in [Cranefield et al., 2017], we assume that
for each value of an agent, there is a value state that rep-
resents the current level of satisfaction for the value. Value
states could be affected both by an agent’s own actions or
by the actions of other agents. For instance, an agent that
donates money would increase the value state of generosity
for itself. On the other hand, if the agent values the envi-
ronment, the value state would decrease for this agent even
if it is another agent that pollutes the environment. Further-
more, in [Cranefield et al., 2017], value states are taken to be
numbers that do not exceed a certain value. They are also
assumed to decay to represent the fact that if no action has
been taken in a while that advances an agent’s value, its sat-
isfaction decreases. Our concern here is not so much about
the actual values but more about the fact that value states can
either increase or decrease. Given a set of actions and a set
of values, we consider the agent’s choice of an action to be
guided by the values. More specifically, an agent’s choice
is such that: i) it increases the value state of each of its val-
ues and/or, ii) it minimises the number of values whose value
state is decreased. The first condition is desirable but is not
always achievable. For instance, you respect traffic rules but
might run a red light in case there is a person requiring imme-
diate hospitalisation. In this case, the value state for helpful-
ness would increase whereas the value state for law abidance
would decrease. However, in this paper, we will assume an
agent’s action increases the value state of each of its values
related to that action. This is a strong assumption and will be
addressed in the discussion section.
We now formalise the notions that were just discussed. We
assume there is a set of all values, V = {a, b, . . .}, fromwhich
an agent’s values are drawn. We also assume that it is possible
1Note the same pair of values might conflict in one context and
not in another - so they may be context-sensitive. However, we do
not take up context-sensitivity in this paper.
for a value v ∈ V to have one or more opposing (conflicting)
values in V . The term ∼v is the set of opposing values of v.
However, if a ∈ V and ∼ a = {b, c}, we abuse notation and
write ∼a = b = c and also let ∼v stand for any opposing
value of v.
Definition 2 Let V ⊆ V . We say V is consistent iff for each
v ∈ V,¬∃v′ ∈ V where v′ = ∼v. Otherwise, it is inconsis-
tent.
Definition 3 Given two sets of values V and V ′ respectively,
the conflict set V ⊥ V ′ is defined as V ⊥ V ′ = {v | v ∈
V and ∃v′ ∈ V ′ where v′ = ∼v}.
Ex 1 If V = {a}, V ′ = {b, c, d} and ∼a = b = c, then
V ⊥ V ′ = {a} and V ′ ⊥ V = {b, c}.
Ex.1 shows⊥ is not symmetric. Some basic properties follow
from these definitions:
Proposition 1 Given two sets of values V, V ′ ⊆ V if one of
V or V ′ is consistent, then V ∩ V ′ is consistent.
Note that even if V and V ′ are both inconsistent, V ∩V ′ could
be consistent. For instance, if V = {a, b} where b = ∼a, and
V ′ = {a, c, d} where d = ∼c, then V ∩ V ′ = {a} which is
consistent. On the other hand, even though both V and V ′ are
consistent, it can be that V ∪ V ′ inconsistent. For instance, if
V = {a}, V ′ = {b}, where b = ∼a, then V ∪ V ′ = {a, b} is
inconsistent.
Proposition 2 Given two sets of values V, V ′ ⊆ V , if one of
V or V ′ is consistent, then V ⊥ V ′ is consistent.
Proposition 3 Given two sets of values V, V ′ ⊆ V , V ⊥ V ′
is inconsistent iff both V and V ′ are individually inconsistent
and there is some value v such that both v,∼v in V and V ′.
Proposition 4 Given three sets of values V, V ′, V ′′ ⊆ V:
1. (V ∩ V ′) ⊥ V ′′ = (V ⊥ V ′′) ∩ (V ′ ⊥ V ′′),
2. (V ∪ V ′) ⊥ V ′′ = (V ⊥ V ′′) ∪ (V ′ ⊥ V ′′).
Proposition 4 shows that ⊥ distributes over ∩ and ∪. How-
ever, the converse doesn’t hold, i.e., ∩ and ∪ do not dis-
tribute over ⊥. We show them below along with the non-
associativity of⊥ for the sake of completeness. For the coun-
terexamples below, let V = {a}, V ′ = {b} , and V ′′ = {a}
where b = ∼a.
1. (V ⊥ V ′′) ∪ V ′ 6= (V ∪ V ′) ⊥ (V ′′ ∪ V ′):
Ex. We get (V ⊥ V ′′) ∪ V ′ = {} ∪ {b} = {b}, and
(V ∪ V ′) ⊥ (V ′′ ∪ V ′) = {a, b} ⊥ {a, b} = {a, b}.
2. (V ⊥ V ′) ∩ V ′′ 6= (V ∩ V ′′) ⊥ (V ′ ∩ V ′′):
Ex. We get (V ⊥ V ′) ∩ V ′′ = {a} ∩ {a} = {a}, and
(V ∩ V ′′) ⊥ (V ′ ∩ V ′′) = {a} ⊥ {} = {}.
3. (V ⊥ V ′) ⊥ V ′′ 6= V ⊥ (V ′ ⊥ V ′′).
Ex. We get (V ⊥ V ′) ⊥ V ′′ = {a} ⊥ {a} = {}, and
V ⊥ (V ′ ⊥ V ′′) = {a} ⊥ {b} = {a}.
2.2 Value-based Trust Assessment
Definition 4 An agent A’s value set, VA, is a subset of V .
Definition 5 Given an agent A and an action a′ ∈ A, the
action value set associated with a′, denoted as V a
′
A , is a subset
of VA that is consistent.
When it is clear from the context, we write V a
′
A simply as
VA. Def. 5 follows from what we mentioned earlier that con-
flicting values cannot be pursued in a single action. We don’t
specify how VA is formed but the values in it should consist of
values that are important w.r.t a′. For example, if I am about
to buy a new piece of furniture, I might care about function-
ality and not beauty; so functionality would be in VA. Note
that we did not mention whether a′ can be executed by A or
not. A might not be able to execute an action but it can still
be aware of the action and the values that are important rel-
ative to it. For instance, you may not know how to drive but
in asking someone to drive, you would still value safety and
comfort. The action value set could also consist of core val-
ues that are important to the agent regardless of any action.
As mentioned earlier, if A can execute a′, it is assumed that
all values in VA increase their value state after executing a.
Basic Trust Assessment
The first case we consider is how an agent might assess its
trust in another agent when requesting a particular action to
be executed.
Definition 6 (Two Agent - Independent) Given an action
a′, two agentsA andB with value sets VA and VB , the value-
based trust assessment TrKA (B, a
′) of B by A is defined as:
TrKA (B, a
′) = | VA ∩ VB | − | VA ⊥ VB |
Intuitively, the level of trust A places in B is determined
both by the values they share, | VA ∩ VB |, and the extent
to which A’s values conflict with B’s, | VA ⊥ VB |. Note
that VB = V
a′
B . Also, VA ⊥ VB is consistent from Proposi-
tion 2. We will at times annotate TrKA (B, a
′) and write it as
TrKA (B, a
′)[independent] since A is not acting on behalf of
any agent. This is mainly to make the presentation simpler
when comparing different trust assessment functions. The
following properties result directly from Def. 6 :
1. if VA ⊥ VB = {}, Tr
K
A (B, a
′) ≥ 0,
2. if VA ∩ VB = {}, Tr
K
A (B, a
′) ≤ 0, and
3. if VA ∩ VB = {} and VA ⊥ VB = {}, Tr
K
A (B, a
′) = 0.
Ex 2 Let VA = {a, b, c, d} and VB = {a, b, e, f, g}, where
∼c = e = f and a′ be some action. We get TrKA (B, a
′) = |
{a, b} | − | {c} | = 2− 1 = 1.
Next, we consider the case where three agents are involved.
Say A asks B to build her a red chair. However, B is only a
carpenter and not a painter. So, B must also request a trust-
worthy painter to paint the chair. We have to be careful here
as there are two value sets concerningB: V buildB and V
paint
B .
The question is which value set does B use in order to pick a
painter C? Since B is fulfilling A’s request, we assume that
V buildB supersedes V
paint
B and is the value set used to choose
C, i.e. VB = V
build
B . If B were acting independently of A,
then it would be more appropriate to take VB as V
paint
B . We
propose two ways that B might adopt to choose C.
Definition 7 (Three Agents - Cautious) Given actions a′
and a′′, three agents A, B and C where B is executing a′ on
behalf of A and C is executing a′′ on behalf of B, and value
sets VA = V
a′
A , VB = V
a′
B and, VC = V
a′′
C , the cautious trust
assessment of C by B is defined as:
TrKB (C, a
′′) =| (VA ∩ VB) ∩ VC | − | (VA ∪ VB) ⊥ VC |
Here, we say B trusts cautiously. It tries to pick an agent
that has the most values common to both itself and A. On
the other hand, it avoids agents that have a lot of values
in conflict with itself or A. At times we use the annotated
form TrKB (C, a
′′)[cautious]. Note that the relevant action
in TrKB (C, a
′′) is a′′ though VB is defined relative to a
′, i.e.
V a
′
B . (VA ∪ VB) may be inconsistent but since VC is con-
sistent, from Proposition 2, we know (VA ∪ VB) ⊥ VC is
consistent.
Ex 3 As in the previous example, let VA = {a, b, c, d} and
VB = {a, b, e, f, g}, where ∼c = e = f . Let VC = {a, e, h}
where ∼g = h. TrKB (C, a
′′) = | {a, b} ∩ {a, e, h} | − |
{a, b, c, d, e, f, g} ⊥ {a, e, h} | =| {a} | − | {c, g} | =
1− 2 = −1.
Definition 8 (Three Agents - Bold) Given actions a′ and
a′′, three agents A, B and C where B is executing a′ on be-
half of A and C is executing a′′ on behalf of B, and value
sets VA = V
a′
A , VB = V
a′
B and, VC = V
a′′
C , the bold trust
assessment of C by B is defined as:
TrKB (C, a
′′) =| (VA ∪ VB) ∩ VC | − | (VA ∪ VB) ⊥ VC |
Here, we say B trusts boldly. The annotated form is
TrKB (C, a
′′)[bold]. As in the previous case, values common
to all three agents are considered but so are values that A and
B independently share with C for assessing the trust in C. In
general, B places at least as much trust in agents as it would
have when being cautious as shown in Proposition 5 below.
Ex 4 As before, VA = {a, b, c, d} and VB = {a, b, e, f, g},
where ∼c = e = f . Let VC = {a, e, h} where ∼g =
h. TrKB (C, a
′) =| {a, b, c, d, e, f, g} ∩ {a, e, h} | − |
{a, b, c, d, e, f, g} ⊥ {a, e, h} |=| {a, e} | − | {c, g} |=
2− 2 = 0.
Proposition 5 Given actions a′ and a′′, three agents A, B
and C with value sets VA, VB and VC where B is execut-
ing a′ on behalf of A and C is executing a′′ on behalf of B,
TrKB (C, a
′′)[bold] ≥ TrKB (C, a
′′)[cautious].
When B trusts boldly or cautiously, it assesses its trust in
C for executing a′′ with A’s value set VA in mind. It is in-
teresting to see what B’s trust in C would be if it ignores
VA. We say B is acting semi-independently because we still
take VB as V
a′
B and not V
a′′
B . The definition for Tr
K
B (C, a
′′)
[semi-independent] is the same as in Def. 6:
Definition 9 (Three Agents - Semi-Independent) Given
actions a′ and a′′, three agents A, B and C with value sets
VA = V
a′
A , VB = V
a′
B and, VC = V
a′′
C , the trust assessment
of C by B is defined as TrKB (C, a
′′)[semi-independent] =
| VB ∩ VC | − | VB ⊥ VC |.
Ex 5 As before, VB = {a, b, e, f, g}, where ∼c = e =
f and VC = {a, e, h} where ∼g = h. Tr
K
B (C, a
′′)
[semi-independent] = | {a, e} | − | {g} | = 2− 1 = 1.
From Ex.3, Ex.4 and Ex.5, we see that TrKB (C, a
′′)
[semi-independent] is greater than TrKB (C, a
′′)[cautious]
or TrKB (C, a
′′)[bold] . In other words, trust that B places in
C when acting semi-independently is greater than when it is
acting on behalf of A. However, this only holds in general
between TrKB (C, a
′′)[semi-independent] and TrKB (C, a
′′)
[cautious], and is shown in the next proposition.
Proposition 6 Given actions a′ and a′′, three agents A, B
andC with value sets VA = V
a′
A , VB = V
a′
B and, VC = V
a′′
C ,
TrKB (C, a
′′)[semi-independent] ≥ TrKB (C, a
′′)[cautious].
The following counterexample shows that TrKB (C, a
′′)
[semi-independent] ≥ TrKB (C, a
′′)[bold] is not true in
general.
Ex 6 As before, let VA = {a, b, c, d} and VB =
{a, b, e, f, g}, where ∼c = e = f . We change VC to
{d, h} where ∼g = h. TrKB (C, a
′′)[semi-independent] =
| {} | − | {g} | = 0 − 1 = −1. TrKB (C, a
′′)[bold] = |
{a, b, c, d, e, f, g}∩{d, h} | − | {a, b, c, d, e, f, g} ⊥ {d, h} |
= | {d} | − | {g} |= 1− 1 = 0.
For the special case, when no two of VA, VB , VC have con-
flicting values with each other, we have the following result:
Proposition 7 Given actions a′ and a′′, three agents A, B
and C with value sets VA, VB and VC that have no con-
flicting values with each other, TrKB (C, a
′′)[cautious] ≤
TrKB (C, a
′′)[semi-independent] ≤ TrKB (C, a
′′)[bold].
Trust Sequences
We now turn our attention to trust sequences when a series of
agents are involved in assessing trust.
Ex 7 Consider agent A has to achieve a goal that requires
the execution of a particular action a′. A, however, cannot
execute a′ and instead must rely on another agent. Assume A
is only aware of agents B and C that can execute a′.
In order to pick the best one amongst the two, A chooses the
one that it believes to be more trustworthy. It does this by
assessing its trust in B and C, TKA (B, a
′)[independent] and
TKA (C, a
′)[independent] respectively.
Ex 8 (cont.) Suppose A has picked B to execute the action
as TKA (B, a
′)[independent] > TKA (C, a
′)[independent].
As seen in the example, A uses a simple rule to pick B or
C. There are two reasons for this: i) A can maximise the
chance of its value states increasing, by picking an agent with
whom it shares the most number of values, and ii) by choos-
ing agents with whom it has fewer conflicting values, it min-
imises the chance of its values being violated. The best sce-
nario for A is the case where either VA ⊆ VB or VA ⊆ VC .
Ex 9 (cont.) Assume that B, in turn, has to request either D
or E to execute another action a′′ to fulfil A’s request.
Similar to what A did, B assesses its trust inD and E. Since
three agents will be involvedA, B and,D orE, we use either
Def. 7 or Def. 8. Similar to the case for two agents, B picks
the greater of TKB (D, a
′′) and TKB (E, a
′′).
Ex 10 (cont.) Assume B chooses D using Def. 7 who then
executes a′′ which is the last action to be executed. The trust
assessments between A, B and D, where B and D are the
chosen agents form a trust assessment sequence as shown:
A
TrK
A
(B,a′)
−−−−−−−→ B
TrK
B
(D,a′′)
−−−−−−−→ D
We now formally define a trust assessment sequence.
Definition 10 A value-based trust sequence or simply a trust
sequence is a sequence of trust assessments, TKAi(Ai+1, ai),
where 1 ≤ i < n, TKAi(Ai+1, ai) represents agent Ai’s trust
assessment of agent Ai+1 w.r.t to action ai and Ai 6= Ai+1.
Shown below is a way to visualise a trust sequence. Trust
assessments on either side are surrounded by the agents in-
volved.
A1
TrK
A1
(A2,a1)
−−−−−−−−→ A2
TrK
A2
(A3,a2)
−−−−−−−−→ . . . An−1
TrK
An−1
(An,an−1)
−−−−−−−−−−−−→ An
The trust sequence above is initiated by A1 (initiator) and
TrKA1(A2, a1) is the initial assessment. All other assessments
will be referred to as subsequent assessments. The last agent
in the sequence to execute an action is An and is called the
terminator. For all i > 1, each Ai represents the agent that
was chosen to execute action ai−1 by agentAi−1. The length
of the sequence is equal to the number of trust assessments,
i.e. n − 1 above. The condition Ai 6= Ai+1 prevents se-
quences where agents assess trust in themselves.2 The num-
ber of agents involved in the sequence is therefore at most n.
In this paper, we only consider sequences where at each step,
an agent only has one trustee. For instance, in Ex.10, there
are no other agents besidesB thatA asks to execute an action
and similarly there is onlyD forB. This leads a sequence that
has no branches. Ex.10 already showed how trust sequences
are generated and now we present it more formally.
Definition 11 Let i ≥ 1, Ai ∈ A be an agent looking for
another agent to execute action ai. The value set of Ai is
VAi . For each X ∈ A where X 6= Ai, that can help execute
ai, we define:
Ai+1 = argmax
X
TrKAi(X, ai),
where if i = 1, TrKA1(X, a1) is given by Def. 6 and if i > 1,
TrKAi(X, ai) is given by one of Def. 7 or Def. 8.
It is clear all trust sequences use Def. 6 but differ on whether
they use Def. 7 or Def. 8. This point forward by a cautious
trust sequence we mean one that uses Def. 7 and by a bold
trust sequence we mean one that use Def. 8 for all i > 1.
2It may be possible that an agent appears again in some other
place in the sequence.
Definition 12 Given a trust sequence S of length n −
1, the aggregate trust of the trust sequence is equal to
n−1∑
i=1
TrKAi(Ai+1, ai) and is denoted as Q(S).
During each trust assessment step in the sequence, we are
computing the difference between the number of values that
are shared and the number of values that are in conflict;
Q(S) is simply the sum of those differences. If it is positive,
then as a whole there are more values preserved between
each step of the sequence compared to the number of values
that are in conflict; if it is negative, the converse is true. Def.
12 also allows us to compute the aggregate trust of a subse-
quence:
∑j
i Tr
K
Ai
(Ai+1, ai), where 1 ≤ i ≤ j and j ≤ n−1.
In Def. 11, Ai may trust either boldly or cautiously to choose
an agent Ai+1. An interesting question to ask is whether Ai
being bold or cautious makes any difference at all, i.e. will
Ai always select the same agent irrespective of whether it is
trusting boldly or cautiously? As the example below shows,
being cautious or bold matters.
Ex 11 Given actions a′ and a′′ and four agents A, B, C and
D where B is executing a′ on behalf of A and has to choose
one between C andD for executing a′′, let VA = {a, b, c, e},
VB = {a, b}, VC = {b} and VD = {c, e}. Consider Tr
K
B (·)
[cautious] first: TrKB (C, a
′′)[cautious] = | (VA∩VB)∩VC |
− | (VA ∪ VB) ⊥ VC | = | {a, b} ∩ {b} | − | {a, b, c, e} ⊥
{b} |=| {b} | − | {} | = 1− 0 = 1. Similarly, TrKB (D, a
′′)
[cautious] = | {a, b} ∩ {c, e} | − | {a, b, c, e} ⊥ {c, e} | =
| {} | − | {} | = 0− 0 = 0. B will choose C if trusting cau-
tiously. Consider TrKB (·)[bold] now: Tr
K
B (C, a
′′)[bold] = |
(VA∪VB)∩VC | − | (VA∪VB) ⊥ VC |= | {a, b, c, e}∩{b} |
− | {a, b, c, e} ⊥ {b} | = | {b} | − | {} | = 1 − 0 = 1.
TrKB (D, a
′′)[bold] = | {a, b, c, e}∩{c, e} | − | {a, b, c, e} ⊥
{c, e} | = | {c, e} | − | {} |= 2 − 0 = 2. So, B will choose
D if trusting boldly which if different from the previous case.
Intuitively, we think of TrKA1(A2, a1) as representing A1’s
trust assessment of A2 w.r.t a1. What is not clear is whether
TrKA1(A2, a1) should be updated to Q(S)? The reason for
this is because A1’s trust in A2 also depends on whether A2
has chosen a trustworthy agent A3 that can help fulfil A1’s
goal. Assuming we do so, the implication of Theorem 1 be-
low is that if Q(·) is used to update A’s trust in B, then the
updated value of A’s trust in B will be greater if agents in the
sequence trust boldly and not cautiously.
Theorem 1 The aggregate trust of the trust sequence S ′ re-
sulting from TrKAi(Ai+1, ai)[bold] is greater than or equal
to the aggregate trust of the trust sequence S resulting from
TrKAi(Ai+1, ai)[cautious], i.e. Q(S
′) ≥ Q(S).
3 Discussion
We discuss some limitations of our work and how it may be
expanded on in the future.
Bias in bold agents Consider again Def. 8 of a bold agent:
TrKB (C, a
′′) =| (VA ∪ VB) ∩ VC | − | (VA ∪ VB) ⊥ VC |
Say B has selected C as TrKB (C, a
′′) is the maximum. For
simplicity, assume there are no conflicting values in VA , VB
and VC . We know (VA∪VB)∩VC = (VA∩VC)∪(VB∩VC).
Assume that | VB ∩ VC | is much bigger than | VA ∩ VC |.
Observe that C is largely biased towards B compared to A
as they share more values. This means in future trust as-
sessments starting with C, A’s values could be ignored as
more of B’s values carry over to the next step in the se-
quence compared to A’s. Now if there happened to be an-
other agent D such that TrKB (D, a
′′) is only slightly smaller
than TrKB (C, a
′′) but | VB ∩ VD | is only slightly bigger than
| VA ∩ VD |, it seems D might be a better choice than C be-
cause as many of A’s values are as likely to be preserved as
B’s. This leads to the slightly more complex definition for
bold agents below:
TrKB (C, a
′′) = | (VA ∪ VB) ∩ VC | − | (VA ∪ VB) ⊥ VC |
− abs(| VA ∩ VC | − | VB ∩ VC |)
A similar kind of bias might exist in the subtrahend
| (VA ∪ VB) ⊥ VC | of Def. 8, i.e. between VA ⊥ VC and
VB ⊥ VC . However, we think minimising the total number
of conflicting values heavily outweighs the importance of
minimising the bias in this case, so accounting for it is
probably unnecessary.
Aggregate trust of a sequence and trust update We men-
tioned previously the possibility of updating TrKA1(A2, a1)
to Q(S) or some other value that is a function of it. The
case where Q(S) < TrKA1(A2, a1) seems plausible as we
can reason that A1 may have overestimated its trust in
A2 because it had no knowledge of other agents involved.
However, if Q(S) > TrKA1(A2, a1), explaining why A1’s
trust in A2 should increase is not easy. This suggests that
Q(S) as a basis of trust update might have to be applied in a
more sophisticated way.
Value Preservation Given a trust sequence S of length n, it
would be convenient to have a measure which at a minimum
could tell us whether a value in the initiator A1 is also in
the terminator An without having to inspect the values of
all agents involved. The aggregate trust of the sequence,
Q(S), doesn’t seem to have the right characteristics for this.
A multiplicative measure based on the ratio between the
number of values preserved and the number of values in
conflict for each trust assessment is one possible option to
explore.
Value Preferences We did not consider preferences over
values such as in [Serramia et al., 2018]. Suppose you have
to choose between two hotels, one in the Downtown area
close to all the local attractions and the other cheaper but
requiring more travel. If you value convenience more than
price, then you would choose the Downtown hotel whereas
if you value price more, you would book the cheaper one.
When another agent is involved, you will likely choose an
agent that has preferences over values similar to yours. This
requires more knowledge and also brings additional com-
plexity. A possible way of doing this is to modify the trust
assessment functions in Def. 6, Def. 7 and Def. 8 so that they
use a measure such as Kendall’s tau distance [Kendall, 1938].
Value States Although we mentioned that values can be ac-
tivated and their value states can either increase or decrease,
we did not consider it in our model. Incorporating this infor-
mation into will be an interesting way to build on the model.
We briefly discuss one way this might be done. Let A and B
be two agents with value sets VA and VB and a
′ be an action
that B is executing on A’s behalf. Let VB ↑ and VB ↓ be the
set of values in VB whose value state increases and decreases
due to the execution of a′ respectively. Then:
VA ↑ VB = {v | v ∈ (VA ∩ VB) ∩ VB ↑} and
VA ↓ VB = {v | v ∈ (VA ∩ VB) ∩ VB ↓}.
VA ↑ VB are values shared by A and B whose value state
increases and, VA ↓ VB are values share by A and B whose
value state decreases. We could then rewrite the trust assess-
ment function in Def. 6 for two agents as:
TrKA (B, a
′) = α | VA ↑ VB | − β | VA ↓ VB | − γ | VA ⊥ VB |,
where α, β and γ are weighting factors. Note that
| VA ∩ VB | in Def. 6 has been replaced by
α | VA ↑ VB | − β | VA ↓ VB |. Both
VA ↑ VB, VA ↓ VB ⊆ VA ∩ VB and in Def. 6 they both con-
tribute positively. We subtract them but we want to be careful
that they don’t equal to zero if | VA ↑ VB |=| VA ↓ VB | and
thus the use of weighting factors. Values in VA ⊥ VB could
also increase and decrease but since they are all in conflict
with A, we do not differentiate between such values. Similar
functions for both Def. 7 and Def. 8 can be constructed.
Public Values and Action Decomposition We assumed that
when agent A is assessing its trust in agent B, the values of
B are publicly visible to A, i.e. A is certain of B’s values.
This is quite a strong assumption. A way to circumvent this
is to instead consider the set of values that A believes B has.
Also, in an earlier example, we considered the task to build a
red chair and we alluded to the fact that there were two ac-
tions involved: build and paint. More work is required on this
aspect of decomposing complex actions into simpler ones. 3
4 Conclusion
We presented a simple approach to how values can be used
by agents to assess their trust in each other. We defined the
notion of value-based trust assessment functions and showed
how they lead to trust sequences. Many of the ideas in this
paper could be further expanded upon and explored in more
detail, and there is much to uncover about how values and
trust are related. We leave it to our future research.
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5 Appendix
Proposition 1 Given two sets of values V, V ′ ⊆ V if one of
V or V ′ is consistent, then V ∩ V ′ is consistent.
Proof 1 1. Follows from the fact that to make V ∩ V ′ incon-
sistent it must be that there is a v such that both v and∼v are
in V and V ′. But at least one is consistent, so it can’t be that
V ∩ V ′ inconsistent.
Proposition 2 Given two sets of values V, V ′ ⊆ V , if one of
V or V ′ is consistent, then V ⊥ V ′ is consistent.
Proof 2 There are three cases to consider. (1) V consistent,
V ′ consistent: Assume V ⊥ V ′ is inconsistent. This means
there is a value v such that both v,∼v ∈ V ⊥ V ′ and from
Def. 3 this implies that both v,∼v ∈ V . However, V is
consistent and we get a contradiction. (2) V consistent, V ′
inconsistent: Proof similar to case 1. (3) V inconsistent, V ′
consistent: Assume V ⊥ V ′ is inconsistent. Again for some
v, both v,∼v ∈ V ⊥ V ′. From Def 3, it must be that v ∈ V
and ∼v ∈ V ′, and ∼v ∈ V and v ∈ V ′. However, as V ′
is consistent, it cannot have both v and v′ which gives us a
contradiction. 
Proposition 3 Given two sets of values V, V ′ ⊆ V , V ⊥ V ′
is inconsistent iff both V and V ′ are individually inconsistent
and there is some value v such that both v,∼v in V and V ′.
Proof 3 Left to Right: Assume V ⊥ V ′ is inconsistent. Then
from Prop. 2, both must V and V ′ are inconsistent. Assume
for contradiction, no value v such that both v,∼v in V and
V ′. By Def 3, for any v′,∼v′ ∈ V , at most one of ∼v′ or v′
in V ⊥ V ′ as V ′ cannot contain both v and v′. This means
V ⊥ V ′ obtained is consistent and leads to a contradiction.
Right to Left: Assume v,∼v in V and V ′. By Def 3, both
v,∼v in V ⊥ V ′ which makes it inconsistent. 
Proposition 4 Given three sets of values V, V ′, V ′′ ⊆ V:
1. (V ∩ V ′) ⊥ V ′′ = (V ⊥ V ′′) ∩ (V ′ ⊥ V ′′),
2. (V ∪ V ′) ⊥ V ′′ = (V ⊥ V ′′) ∪ (V ′ ⊥ V ′′).
Proof 4
1. (V ∩ V ′) ⊥ V ′′ = (V ⊥ V ′′) ∩ (V ′ ⊥ V ′′): We show
that if some v ∈ (V ∩ V ′) ⊥ V ′′ then it must also be in
(V ⊥ V ′′) ∩ (V ′ ⊥ V ′′) and vice versa. Left-hand Side: Let
some v ∈ (V ∩V ′) ⊥ V ′′. Then it must be that v ∈ (V ∩V ′)
and ∼v ∈ V ′′. Since v ∈ (V ∩ V ′) and ∼v ∈ V ′′ , it
must be that v ∈ (V ⊥ V ′′) and v ∈ (V ′ ⊥ V ′′). Thus,
v ∈ (V ⊥ V ′′) ∩ (V ′ ⊥ V ′′). Right-hand Side: Let some
v ∈ (V ⊥ V ′′) ∩ (V ′ ⊥ V ′′). Then v ∈ (V ⊥ V ′′) and
v ∈ (V ′ ⊥ V ′′) or v ∈ V , v ∈ V ′ and ∼v ∈ V ′′. Thus
v ∈ (V ∩ V ′) and therefore v ∈ (V ∩ V ′) ⊥ V ′′. 
2. (V ∪ V ′) ⊥ V ′′ = (V ⊥ V ′′) ∪ (V ′ ⊥ V ′′): We
show that if some v ∈ (V ∪ V ′) ⊥ V ′′ then it must also
be in (V ⊥ V ′′) ∪ (V ′ ⊥ V ′′). Left-hand Side: Let some
v ∈ (V ∪ V ′) ⊥ V ′′. Then v ∈ (V ∪ V ′) and ∼v ∈ V ′′.
There are three cases to consider. a) v ∈ V, v 6∈ V ′: Thus
v ∈ (V ⊥ V ′′) and therefore, v ∈ (V ⊥ V ′′) ∪ (V ′ ⊥ V ′′).
b) v 6∈ V, v ∈ V ′: Similar to previous case. c) v ∈ V, v ∈ V ′:
Similar to previous case. Right-hand Side: Let v ∈ (V ⊥
V ′′) ∪ (V ′ ⊥ V ′′). There are three cases to consider. a)
v ∈ (V ⊥ V ′′), v 6∈ (V ′ ⊥ V ′′),∼v ∈ V ′′: Then v ∈ V
which means v ∈ (V ∪V ′) and therefore v ∈ (V ∪V ′) ⊥ V ′′.
b) v 6∈ (V ⊥ V ′′), v ∈ (V ′ ⊥ V ′′),∼v ∈ V ′′: Similar to
previous case. c) v ∈ (V ⊥ V ′′), v ∈ (V ′ ⊥ V ′′),∼v ∈ V ′′:
Similar to previous case. 
Proposition 5 Given actions a′ and a′′, three agents A, B
and C with value sets VA, VB and VC where B is execut-
ing a′ on behalf of A and C is executing a′′ on behalf of B,
TrKB (C, a
′′)[bold] ≥ TrKB (C, a
′′)[cautious].
Proof 5 The minuend in TrKB (C, a
′′)[bold] =| (VA ∪ VB) ∩
VC | and the minuend in Tr
K
B (C, a
′′)[cautious] = (VA ∩
VB) ∩ VC . Since (VA ∩ VB) ∩ VC ⊆ (VA ∪ VB) ∩ VC , it
follows | (VA ∩ VB) ∩ VC | ≤ | (VA ∪ VB) ∩ VC |. The
subtrahends | (VA ∪ VB) ⊥ VC | are the same, so it must be
that TrKB (C, a
′′)[bold] ≥ TrKB (C, a
′′)[cautious]. 
Proposition 6 Given actions a′ and a′′, three agents A, B
andC with value sets VA = V
a′
A , VB = V
a′
B and, VC = V
a′′
C ,
TrKB (C, a
′′)[semi-independent] ≥ TrKB (C, a
′′)[cautious].
Proof 6 We know TrKB (C, a
′′)[semi-independent] =| VB∩
VC | − | VB ⊥ VC |. We know Tr
K
B (C, a
′′)[cautious] =|
(VA ∩VB)∩VC | − | (VA ∪VB) ⊥ VC |. Since (VA ∩VB)∩
VC ⊆ VB ∩ VC , it follows | (VA ∩ VB) ∩ VC | ≤ | VB ∩
VC |. Also, we know from Prop. 4 that (VA ∪ VB) ⊥ VC =
(VA ⊥ VC) ∪ (VB ⊥ VC), so it follows that | VB ⊥ VC |
≤ | (VA ∪ VB) ⊥ VC |. Thus, Tr
K
B (C, a
′′)[independent] ≥
TrKB (C, a
′′)[cautious]. 
Proposition 7 Given actions a′ and a′′, three agents A, B
and C with value sets VA, VB and VC that have no con-
flicting values with each other, TrKB (C, a
′′)[cautious] ≤
TrKB (C, a
′′)[semi-independent] ≤ TrKB (C, a
′′)[bold].
Proof 7 We already know from Prop.5 and Prop.6 that
TrKB (C, a
′′)[cautious] is less that or equal to TrKB (C, a
′′)
[bold] and TrKB (C, a
′′)[semi-independent]. Since there
are no conflicts of values between agents TrKB (C, a
′′)
[independent] = | VB ∩ VC | − 0 and Tr
K
B (C, a
′′)
[bold] = | (VA∪VB)∩VC | − 0. VB∩VC ⊆ (VA∪VB)∩VC ,
so | VB ∩ VC | ≤ | (VA ∪ VB) ∩ VC | and thus Tr
K
B (C, a
′)
[independent] ≤ TrKB (C, a
′)[bold]. 
Theorem 1 The aggregate trust of the trust sequence S ′ re-
sulting from TrKAi(Ai+1, ai)[bold] is greater than or equal
to the aggregate trust of the trust sequence S resulting from
TrKAi(Ai+1, ai)[cautious], i.e. Q(S
′) ≥ Q(S).
Proof 8 Take any sequence S of length n constructed us-
ing TrKAi(Ai+1, ai)[cautious]. It is enough to show that
we can construct a sequence S ′ using TrKB (·)[bold] whose
aggregate trust is greater or equal to that of S. For i =
j = 1, since we must use TrKAi(Ai+1, ai)[independent]
for both S and S′, Q11(S) = Q
1
1(S
′). When i = 1 and
j = 2, for S, let TrKA2(A3, a2)[cautious] = k and let A3
be some agent X . Now for S′, if there is an agent A3 = Y
such that TrKA2(Y, a2)[bold] > Tr
K
A2
(X, a2)[cautious], then
Q21(S
′) > Q21(S) as we previously established Q
1
1(S) =
Q11(S
′). If there isn’t one, for S′, we can still choose
X and we know from Prop. 5 that TrA2B (X, a2)[bold] ≥
TrKA2(X, a2)[cautious], thus Q
2
1(S
′) ≥ Q21(S). We can rea-
son similarly for 2 < j ≤ n and hence Q(S ′) ≥ Q(S). 
